

# CAN WE STILL SAY "RIGHT"?

KERRY R. BOLTON

---

Particularly in the Anglophone world, the terms "Right wing," "New Right," and "conservative" have become synonymous with free trade, libertarianism, and the "free market." Hence, when a government, such as that of the National Party in New Zealand or the Conservative Party in Britain embarks on "privatization," cutbacks on welfare, fiscal austerity, and the withdrawal of the state from intervening in the economy in favor of "market forces," such actions are usually described as pursuing a "Right-wing" agenda.<sup>1</sup> Welfare recipients are often singled out as scapegoats in times of governmental economic ineptitude, as though welfarism is—in general—a cause rather than a symptom. Hence, for example, a popular target for supposedly "center-right" governments, are single parents, with a hurrah chorus from those considered "conservative" when a government spouts its rhetoric on imposing sanctions on single parents, should they not go out to find non-existent jobs (thanks to the "free market") in addition to trying to raise children on their own?

What is lost on such paragons of "conservatism" and the "center-right" is that this mentality, which gives priority to the integration of women into the labor force rather than raising children, is fundamentally Bolshevik. Trotsky would have wholeheartedly approved.<sup>2</sup> This is but one salient example of the socialistic mentality that is now regarded as "Right-wing," because what is "Right" is confused with capitalism, which shares with socialism the dogma of economic reductionism.

One of the last great luminaries of the traditional order of Europe, Prince Otto von Habsburg, in a manifesto that merits renewed attention

---

<sup>1</sup> A typical example of this is *New Rights New Zealand: Myths, Moralities and Markets* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2005), by Associate Professor Dolores Janiewski and Professor Paul Morris.

<sup>2</sup> See Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed*, trans. Max Eastman (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1937), section titled "Thermidor in the Family." Here Trotsky laments the undoing by Stalin of the good work that the early Bolshevik regime had undertaken in destroying the "family hearth" by consigning children to the factory crèche and women to the factory floor, as per the present-day demands of Republican and other oddly named "conservatives." Not surprisingly, liberalism during



by the Right, explained the traditional Right viewpoint:

Though the contrast between Marxism and capitalism is constantly being discussed, the similarities actually far outweigh the differences. Though they entrust the control of property to different hands, their basic philosophy is the same. Both systems attach a central importance to economics, to production. Both are, in the last analysis, materialistic, and regard economic laws as the basic laws of society. Both are not genuinely "social" — though Marxism has frequently misused the word socialism for its own purposes. For "social" as the word itself tells us, means putting man in the centre, while both Marxism and capitalism are primarily concerned with material considerations.<sup>3</sup>

Habsburg, who was born in 1912 and lived to be nearly 100, maintained an attitude that was carried over from a past era when the last of the traditional leadership stratum of the West was as opposed to free trade capitalism as it was to Marxism. If one wants to consult a Rightist answer to the present crisis of the West from possibly the last spokesman of the traditional order, one can do well to consult Habsburg's *The Social Order of Tomorrow*. We find therein what outraged Karl Marx so much in his own time, what he called a "reactionary" doctrine that sought to unite noble, priest, artisan, and farmer against the double menace of capitalism and "socialism."

The Republican Party in the United States has been described in the same terms, as "conservative" and "Right-wing," when advocating neo-Whig liberalism.<sup>4</sup> Even on the European continent, many of the parties that are regarded as "Right-wing" because they campaign for Third World immigration restriction or demand an assimilationist ("one nation") policy towards immigrants, embrace free market economic policies. At least some of these parties are clear-sighted enough as to their own identity to refer to themselves as "classical liberal" rather than as

---

<sup>3</sup> Otto von Habsburg, *The Social Order of Tomorrow: State and Society in the Atomic Age*, trans. Ivo Jarosy (London: Oswald Wolff, 1958), 31-32.

<sup>4</sup> Hence the Republican Party in the United States is regarded as "Right-wing," which is also regarded as synonymous with being the "party of the wealthy." See Tim Dickinson, "How the GOP Became the Party of the Rich," *Rolling Stone* (November 9, 2011). This article is quite perceptive, but he nonetheless blames the shift on "right-wing intellectual, Irving Kristol" (!).

<http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how-the-gop-became-the-party-of-the-rich> 201111100



"Right-wing"<sup>5</sup> – a label applied to them by journalists and academics.

As I have argued elsewhere, the free trade party is not Right-wing and never has been.<sup>6</sup> The "Right" is nothing if not based on tradition. This does not mean to say that the Right cannot also stand for modernization, technology, and what is generally referred to today as "progress," as indicated by what Habsburg outlined for the "atomic age" in his 1958 manifesto. To the contrary, some of the most innovative regimes have been Right-wing; however, they have advanced such policies with a view as to how "progress" will impact upon traditional social and moral foundations, rather than, as with both capitalism and socialism, solely on the basis of production and consumption. Likewise, it has generally been the "Right-wing" artists who have provided innovation in the arts, while also repudiating the nihilism of the "Left," in the pursuit of different techniques that nonetheless maintain traditional anchorage. One might think here immediately of literary and artistic luminaries such as Knut Hamsun, D. H. Lawrence, Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, Salvador Dalí, and Wyndham Lewis.<sup>7</sup>

In the economic and social realms, traditionalist (i.e., Right-wing) social and moral ethics are reflected in the socio-economic-moral structure of the guild that ruled both the ancient and medieval worlds for centuries, prior to capitalism.<sup>8</sup> The "organic society," a social order based on the model of the living human organism, reflected what Italian Tradi-

---

<sup>5</sup> See my survey on the economic policies of "Right-wing" parties: Kerry R. Bolton, "Breaking the Bondage of Usury: Where Is the Right?," *Ab Aeterno*, no. 14 (January-March 2013): 22-32. For example, the Austrian Freedom Party, referred to as "Right-wing" and even as "neo-Nazi," has an economic policy that is self-described as "libertarian," and its programme refers to commitment to the "market economy." Italy's Northern League focuses on tax reduction.

<sup>6</sup> Kerry R. Bolton, "Marx Contra Marx: A Traditionalist Conservative Critique of the Communist Manifesto," *Anamnesis Journal* (March 2012).

<http://anamnesisjournal.com/2012/03/kr-bolton/>

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Kerry R. Bolton, *Artists of the Right* (San Francisco: Counter-Currents Publishing, 2012).

<sup>8</sup> See Kerry R. Bolton, "Corporatism as a Perennial Method of Traditional Social Organisation," in *Aristokratia*, ed. K. Deva, vol. 2 (n.p.: Manticore Press, 2014). See also Plato, *The Republic* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976), "Preliminaries: First Principles of Social Organisation," 369e. Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, Part II.

<http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.mb.txt>

Julius Evola, *Men Among the Ruins: Post-War Reflections of a Radical Traditionalist*, trans. Guido Stucco (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 2002), chapter titled "Economy and Politics – Corporations – Unity of Work" (224-34), where he discussed the corporate, organic state as the traditional means of social organization.



tionalist philosopher Julius Evola called the "normal way of looking at things," by which he meant the traditional way. The idea of contending economic classes appears during cycles of cultural decay. Oswald Spengler pointed out the rebellion of Tiberius Gracchus as an early example of the party of money backing a revolt in the name of "the people":

The concepts of Liberalism and Socialism are set in effective motion only by money. It was the Equites, the big-money party, which made Tiberius Gracchus's popular movement possible at all; and as soon as that part of the reforms that was advantageous to themselves had been successfully legalized, they withdrew and the movement collapsed.<sup>9</sup>

Spengler explains further that in analogous terms, "the Jacobins had destroyed the old obligations of the blood [*noblesse oblige*] and so had emancipated money." Further, "there is no proletarian, not even a Communist, movement that has not operated in the interest of money."<sup>10</sup> Hence the "revolutionary party," i.e., the "Left-wing party," is the party of money against tradition. The Right advocated a reorganization of society that was founded on the return to an organic conception of society that is of a perennial character, insofar as the perennial type of social organization that has been maintained throughout history since ancient Rome is based on a corporate society. Here the body politic (a most apt term in this instance) sees the individual as analogous to the cell of a living organism, each social or professional group as an organ and the state as the brain. In performing its distinct function, each cell and organ contributes to the well-being of the whole organism. This was reflected in the guild structure of the traditional order, from ancient Rome onwards, vestiges of which survived right up until the revolt of the bourgeois against the *ancien régime* in 1789.

The doctrine was revived by the Right in the crisis of the post-1918 world in the form of corporatist states from the Austria of Dollfuss, to Salazar's "New State," to Mussolini's Italy, and Brazil under Vargas. Habsburg recommends a return to this traditional form of social organization. He critiques the nebulous character of modern democratic parliaments that

---

<sup>9</sup> Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971), 2:402.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*



the moment industrial development brought about a complete shift in social power, it lost its influence. The senate must therefore represent the real social forces in the State. A practical formula would be to let one-third of the senators be appointed by groupings of social and economic interests, such as trade unions and employers' federations, another third would be chosen from the professional and cultural field—the churches, education, science, the arts and the family. The remaining senators would represent the territorial subdivisions of the State. Practical experience has shown that nominated senators can seldom function effectively, as they are not taken seriously by their elected colleagues.<sup>11</sup>

Insofar as the traditional conception of the state is organic, sectional interests arising from economics, and manifested in party and class divisions can literally be seen as cancerous: they are attacks upon the cells and organs of the body politic. As we shall see below, the Right constitutes the organic approach to society; the Left a cancerous approach which is reflected in capitalism as much as in Marxism and other such class war notions. As Habsburg, Spengler, et al., pointed out, Marxism and "class war" doctrines cannot even be regarded as "socialist," as the term implies organic unity, not division; Spengler even referred to his politics as "Prussian socialism."

The anti-traditional, subversive character of liberal capitalism is intrinsically opposed to any form of organic social bond, such as that of nationality or ethnicity. Marx and Engels pointed out in *The Communist Manifesto* that the internationalizing impact of capitalism, which we now call "globalization," would undermine any concept of nation or nationality, and hence classes would become internationally oriented. This would be an inevitable consequence of the "uniformity of the mode of production."<sup>12</sup> Hence, capitalism outgrew its imperial phase, and now opposes as "anti-progressive" any barrier to the free flow of capital, labor, and technology. It is why the tax-free foundations, globalist think tanks, and indeed the weight of the United States and its allies, will fight tooth and nail against any and all barriers to global profit maximization. It is why these moneyed interests are avid promoters of "immigration reform," to allow for the free flow of labor, in the same way as they op-

<sup>11</sup> Habsburg, *The Social Order of Tomorrow*, 133.

<sup>12</sup> Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1954), 2.



pose import or currency controls. It is why the US State Department officially sponsors multicultural programs, such as "hip hop" concerts in Europe, and especially in a France that is still too xenophobic for its taste.<sup>13</sup>

It is all part—money, machinery, *people*—of the same economic process. Ayn Rand, a guru of free trade ideology, succinctly stated that "racism" is a form of "collectivism."<sup>14</sup> Indeed it is. That is to say, it is an organic collectivity, just as much as any form of organic polity, and expresses social bonds that override egocentrism. It is an essential element of man as a political animal, in the Aristotelian sense. One, then, sees individuals and organizations referred to as "Right-wing" and "conservative" mouthing the same platitudes about race and immigration as the Left—stating that we are all individuals and should only be judged as such, and in particular judged according to how one might be placed in a consumer society. It is why those called "Right-wingers" by media pundits and academics can advocate a "color-blind society,"<sup>15</sup> and quote the likes of Martin Luther King as paragons of conservatism.

#### ORIGINS OF THE POLITICAL "WINGS"

From where, then, did the concepts of the Right and Left wings of a "political spectrum" derive in our modern era? The answer is to be found in the seating arrangements of the French National Assembly. Those who supported the *ancien régime* sat on the right side, and those in opposition on the left side. This original seating arrangement was significant for that time, and the symbolism remains significant in returning to what is genuinely "Right" and "Left." However, it makes no sense to apply these categories to the present seating arrangements of parliaments, where those in office, including Communists or Marxists, sit on the right side of the house, and those in opposition, including conservatives, sit on the left. However, it is also just as nonsensical to apply the

<sup>13</sup> Kerry R. Bolton, *Babel Inc.: Multiculturalism, Globalisation and the New World Order* (London: Black House Publishing, 2013), 179–241.

<sup>14</sup> Ayn Rand, "Racism," in *The Virtue of Selfishness* (New York: New American Library, 1964). The essay begins: "Racism is the lowest, most crudely primitive form of collectivism." Her denial of any biological component to human social and cultural development is a mirror image of Left-wing sociology and anthropology, as per Trofim Lysenko or Franz Boas.

<sup>15</sup> For an example of this befuddled thinking from the supposed "extreme Right," see John Ansell, "How Does the Name Colourblind State Grab You?" <http://treatygate.wordpress.com/2012/09/17/how-does-the-name-colourblind-state-grab-you/comment-page-1/>



term "Right" to all and sundry, from "neo-Nazi skinheads" to free-trade classical liberals.

Baron de Gauville explained the origins of the Left and the Right in the French Assembly:

We began to recognize each other: those who were loyal to religion and the king took up positions to the right of the chair so as to avoid the shouts, oaths, and indecencies that enjoyed free rein in the opposing camp.<sup>16</sup>

Later, during the nineteenth century, seating arrangements, as with our present parliaments, no longer reflected ideology.<sup>17</sup> However, during the opening years of the twentieth century, Left and Right began again to be temporarily identified in France with ideology; however, meaninglessness has again returned to the concepts.

Much nonsense has been written by academics who define the Left as standing for "social justice" and "progressive ideas," while the Right stands for entrenched interests, no matter what those interests are. Such definitions are as moralistic as they are self-serving. Hence, we have long come to the situation of defining the Left as anti-capitalist and the Right as pro-capitalist. This is actually a reversal of the original concepts.

This "progress," under which any changes are justified, is nothing of the sort. What we are seeing unfolding in the West, since the French Revolution, and earlier,<sup>18</sup> has been seen before in prior civilizations. The

---

<sup>16</sup> Marcel Gauchet, "Right and Left," in *Realms of Memory: Conflicts and Divisions*, ed. Pierre Nora and Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 242.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 253.

<sup>18</sup> The English Puritan Revolution of the seventeenth century had analogous elements to the French, and also had lasting consequences, especially insofar as—like the French Revolution—it elevated the merchant as the new ruling class. Despite the restoration of England to a monarchy, money has remained ever since in control, in a process that can be traced even earlier to the era of Henry VIII. See Kerry R. Bolton, *The Banking Swindle* (London: Black House Publishing, 2013), 22–23.

It is among the factions of the English Revolution that we might also trace precursors of the Left and the Right, the Puritans constituting the Left which, like the French Revolution, was a combination of merchant interests with proto-communists (the Levellers), against the traditional order, while the Right was constituted in the Cavaliers. Interestingly, Judah P. Benjamin, Secretary of State of the Confederate States of America, saw the fight between the North and the South as a fight between plutocracy/industrialism and tradition/ruralism and saw the analogy with the English Revolution. He chose a depiction of George Washington as a Cavalier to symbolize the South.



Left, including capitalism, sees history as linear-progressive, the Right sees history as cyclical.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, justifying some extreme change in morals, especially, as "progressive," and that you "cannot stop progress," really means nothing. It is the money-obsession of the Left, including capitalism, which aims to revert back to a primitive level of material existence in which base instincts are predominant, and this can be seen with the continuing decline of culture in our "modern" era for the sake of mass marketing, which the Left applauds as "democratization" and capitalism promotes for the sake of profit maximization.

If we look to the character of the France of the *ancien régime* that the Right was attempting to defend in the face of bourgeois rabble-rousers, we find that it was pre-capitalist, and the guilds had remained intact from the medieval era. The French Revolution broke the vestiges of the traditional order of the West. Like many revolutions before and since,<sup>20</sup> the Revolution was undertaken in the name of "the people." In reality it meant the destruction of the remnants of organic society, where the King was a transcendent unifier, and replacing the aristocracy with the merchant. "The people," as in other such revolutions, were mere cannon fodder. The freedom was for commerce, without the strictures and ethics of the traditional order. Howard J. Wiarda writes of the era:

The emphasis on the individual and on individual rights accelerated in the West during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment; in the course of the French Revolution beginning in 1789, and subsequently throughout most of the rest of Europe, group rights (of the Roman Catholic Church, guilds, and other groups) were extinguished. Thereafter, at least in the West, the atomistic individual ruled supreme, while the older system of historic or natural corporatism was snuffed out.<sup>21</sup>

The French Revolution, from which the modern "Left" emerged, ushered in economic liberalism and the primacy of economics which con-

---

See Kerry R. Bolton, "Was the Confederacy a Tool of International Finance?" Counter-Currents Publishing (October 21, 2010).  
<http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/10/was-the-confederacy-a-tool-of-international-finance-1/>

<sup>19</sup> Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, *passim*.

<sup>20</sup> Kerry R. Bolton, *Revolution from Above* (London: Arktos Media, 2011).

<sup>21</sup> Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great "Is"* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 17.



... to dominate the West and increasingly much of the rest of the world through what is called "globalization." Hence, if we trace the Right and Left wings of the modern political dichotomy to France, as political science generally does, what is seen is that the Left emerged from the merchant party, as it has since ancient times, as Spengler pointed out. It is the Right, as the custodian of tradition, which upheld the ancient ethos of trade and economics as being subordinate to politics.

The Chapelier Law of 1791 abolished the guilds or the corporations, as they were called in France. The Leftist revolution ushered in modern capitalism. Until the Revolution, royalist France was a corporatist state.<sup>22</sup> Church doctrine on corporatism, also called the "organic state," which is more descriptive, was the foundation of pre-revolutionary France. It was based on a sixteenth-century Church document: "The head is the king. The arms are the nobility. The feet are the third estate . . . the clergy is the heart. The three estates are members of one body, of one province which is mother to them all."<sup>23</sup> Emmet Kennedy remarks that "one man is seen equal to another," and that "although the members perform different functions, they are integrated organically into one body," although he adds that rivalry between the corporations began to emerge.<sup>24</sup>

For the Right, the notion of class conflict, that emerged from capitalism and was made into a dogma by the Marxists, is cancerous, for it attacks the cells and organs of an organic society. The notion of representation through a political party is of the same cancerous doctrine of division and attack upon the cells of the social organism. That is why traditional societies were represented by corporations or guilds, ideally not as contending factions, but as components of an organic totality, and why political parties representing factional interests are also a cancer upon the body politic. It is why commercial competition was looked at as immoral and ungodly in pre-capitalist—traditional—societies. It is also why Julius Evola recommended the creation of a corporative social order as the best model for society within the modern era, and why corporatism seemed to be the wave of the future, beyond both capitalism and Marxism, between the world wars, and even surviving in Peron's Argentina,<sup>25</sup> Vargas' Brazil, Franco's Spain, and Portugal under Salazar

<sup>22</sup> Emmet Kennedy, *A Cultural History of the French Revolution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 13.

<sup>23</sup> Quoted by Kennedy, *A Cultural History of the French Revolution*, 15.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Kerry R. Bolton, *Peron and Peronism* (London: Black House Publishing, 2014). Peron generally referred to the "Corporate Nation" as the "organized community."



and Caetano for considerably longer; i.e., notably in strongly Catholic states that saw this as a means of overturning materialism and implanting the traditional social teachings of the Church.

Napoleon, in his heroic efforts to reverse Jacobinism, placed economics back under state subordination, and partially revived the guilds, despite objections from commercial interests.<sup>26</sup>

The purpose of the 1789 Revolution was to replace the King with the merchant and other bourgeois elements from the Third Estate, which also used other members of the Third Estate, "the people," as the muscle. While the support of "the people" for the Revolution against the King has been exaggerated,<sup>27</sup> the 1789 revolution was one of the first revolts of the modern era in which moneyed interests used "the people" to overthrow those who stood in the way of plutocracy. Something similar had already been achieved by Cromwell in seventeenth-century England, while moneyed interests can be seen as funding the revolts against the Czar in Russia,<sup>28</sup> and continue to the present day with the "color revolutions" and "Arab Spring," funded by such plutocrats as George Soros, and such bodies as the National Endowment for Democracy.<sup>29</sup>

To the Marxists, this triumph of revolutionary capitalism was an advance in the dialectics of history, insofar as the bourgeois revolt in France brought an end to pre-capitalist society. Those who defended the traditional, pre-capitalist order, or fought for a return to it, were regarded by Marx with particular contempt as "reactionaries," who sought to reverse the dialectical "wheel of history."<sup>30</sup> That is why Marx supported free trade, regarding it as a subversive movement that would undermine the traditional order.<sup>31</sup> It is therefore ironic that today we hear from academics and media pundits that free market economics is a doctrine of the Right. It is nothing of the kind: neither Old Right nor New Right.

What the original Left in France sought was the establishment of free trade on the ruins of the strongly controlled socio-economic structure of the *ancien régime*. Like the frenetic idiots of today who demand "free-

<sup>26</sup> Robert B. Holtman, *The Napoleonic Revolution* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1967), 106.

<sup>27</sup> There was strong opposition from "the people," such as the revolt of the Vendée region.

<sup>28</sup> Bolton, *Revolution from Above*, 57-65.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 213-44.

<sup>30</sup> Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 41.

<sup>31</sup> Oswald Spengler, *The Hour of Decision, Part One: Germany and World-Historical Evolution*, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1934), 14.  
ing Karl Marx, Appendix to *Elend der Philosophie*, 1847.



dom" during the well-planned and funded "spontaneous revolutions" that we have seen surge across the former Soviet bloc and North Africa, what this "freedom" means, more than anything else, is the "freedom of the market," the freedom of predatory global capitalism to take over the resources and assets of a nation. In 1789 the Jacobins and other revolutionaries among the bourgeois, merchants, disaffected intellectuals and debased "nobles" combined together under the meaningless slogan of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." They agitated, bought, or intoxicated a sufficient number of whores, criminals, and drunkards to overthrow the Monarch and the Church, while the real "will of the people" was brutally suppressed in events such as the massacre of the Vendée.<sup>32</sup> While it is true that the French economy, particularly its taxation system, was in disarray, it is nonsense to claim that the revolt was a spontaneous rebellion of "the people" against "tyranny." It was the assumption to power of the bourgeoisie and of bourgeois elements that had bought their way into the "nobility."<sup>33</sup>

What the Right in its traditional role sought—and seeks—is the restoration of a pre-capitalist order, which Marx condemned as "reactionary." In a precise sense it is the Right, including conservatism, that is "revolutionary" insofar as a "revolution" is a return to origins while revolving on an axis.<sup>34</sup> The apt term "conservative revolution" arose in Weimar Germany to categorize a range of philosophers who, while differing in major ways, nonetheless usually sought a pre-capitalist order, which required the overthrow of capitalism. These "conservative revolutionaries" included Oswald Spengler, Ernst Jünger, Otto and Gregor Strasser, and Arthur Moeller van den Bruck. Marxism and other forms of socialism aim in establishing a post-capitalist society to synthesize elements of capitalism into a new dialectic, which, as the conservative

<sup>32</sup> See Nesta H. Webster, *The French Revolution* (London: Constable, 1919). New edition forthcoming from Wermod and Wermod Publishers.

<sup>33</sup> While the merchant is at the top of the scale in liberal and capitalist societies, in traditional societies, he is relegated to a position subordinated to the noble, priest, and aristocrat, whether in Vedic India or France's *ancien régime*. Therefore, it is not incumbent on the Right, in its genuine sense, to champion the bourgeoisie, whether as a class or as an ideal, above any others of the "Third Estate," but to establish an organic community where the Estates have ordained functions within a totality: the organic society.

<sup>34</sup> The concept of an "axis," or a central focus that is regarded as of metaphysical origin, is basic to traditional societies, and is most commonly manifested in the monarch, or priest-king. On this, see Julius Evola, *Revolt Against the Modern World*, trans. Guido Stucco (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 1995). William Butler Yeats refers to the concept in his poem, "The Second Coming."



8 2014

revolutionaries pointed out, is fundamentally capitalist in outlook, and declares its aim to be nothing more than the replacement of the bourgeois ruling class with a proletarian ruling class, at least in theory if not in practice. Hence, the Marxian dialectic overtly aims to create a new dialectical synthesis from out of capitalism, and must therefore include the capitalist ethic as its basis, indeed the starting point, for a "socialist" society. This is why Marxism, including Communism, insists that capitalism is a necessary stage in the development of socialism and ultimately of Communism. Spengler, Evola, and other "conservative revolutionaries" recognized that Marxism and other forms of class-war "socialism" were bogus insofar as they claimed to overthrow capitalism. Spengler, Evola, et al. stated that these types of "socialism" were capitalist in character because Marxism and the like aims to harness capitalism rather than reject it.<sup>35</sup> Hence, the Right, in the genuine sense, advocated not free trade and bourgeois values, but what they also called "socialism" because they aimed at the total repudiation of capitalism and a return to a pre-capitalist society. That is why an ultra-conservative such as Oswald Spengler could call his political doctrine "Prussian Socialism."<sup>36</sup>

#### LIBERALISM OF BOTH TYPES

It is also here in the French Revolution that we find the origins of modern liberalism, whether of the socialistic variety, or of its supposed opposite, "classical liberalism," the latter also often mistaken as being "Right-wing." Both forms of liberalism seek to overturn the organic character of traditional societies in the name of the supremacy of the individual, albeit the Left-wing form of liberalism as manifested by the French Revolution, being imposed by a "social contract" between individuals that establishes "society" on a legalistic basis that is supposed to ensure that the individual can go about his business of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," as the highest of human ideals. This was described by the English philosopher John Locke, one of the seminal thinkers of liberalism, writing: "All mankind . . . being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."<sup>37</sup> Here we see in Locke's classical liberalism, supposedly a forerunner of the modern Right while also a foundation of free trade capitalism, the same fundamental fallacies taken up by the liberal Left.

<sup>35</sup> Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, 2:469.

<sup>36</sup> Oswald Spengler, "Prussianism and Socialism," in *Selected Essays*, trans. Donald O. White (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967).

<sup>37</sup> John Locke, *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, chapter 2, section 6



Hence, again, while the classical liberal champions of capitalism herald themselves as opponents of the liberal Left and of "socialism," both forms of liberalism, like Marxism and capitalism, are based on the same premises. Locke bases his doctrine on the same fallacious arguments about property and equality that were later merely adjusted by Marx. There is nothing for the Right to be found in classical liberalism, and we can see how both classical liberalism and the proto-Marxian liberalism of the Jacobins could readily combine as one in overthrowing the *ancien régime*. Locke had expressed the doctrine thus:

To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.<sup>38</sup>

In Locke's treatise we have the same appeal to "nature" as perceived by the drawing-room intelligentsia, the same appeal to equality, and the same primacy given to economic relations, as enunciated later by Marx. This is why Spengler, writing in the same context with reference to the classical liberal economist and philosopher Adam Smith, stated that, "as for Smith's greatest adversary, Marx, it matters little how loudly one protests against English capitalism when one is thoroughly imbued with its images; the protest itself is a recognition, and its only aim is, through a new kind of accounting, to confer upon objects the advantage of being subjects."<sup>39</sup>

Locke's premise is that humanistic law is the basis of society, and the

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, chapter 2, section 4.



state exists only to oversee the contractual relations between individuals. Hence, community and society become meaningless, and any higher purpose for man other than the pursuit of egotism is suppressed, in the instance of the French Revolution, by wholesale violence, and tyranny in the name of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." Such theories are the basis not only of our modern liberal-democratic, capitalist societies, but also of the so-called "socialist" societies of the Left, including that of Bolshevism, as Spengler and others already referred to, pointed out.

A present-day Communist states something of a similar nature, in lauding the French Revolution dialectically, not only as a revolution against tradition and in favor of free trade, but as the birthplace of modern socialism. Martin Thomas notes that

the French Revolution marked a new start. It was the most radical of the revolutions which replaced the [old] order of fixed hierarchy and privilege by a new system of free trade, free enterprise, equality before the law, and a ruling class based on profits from the market economy. It provided the example of how an old regime could be completely overturned and society reconstructed on new principles, it set the benchmarks for radical and democratic politics within the limits of capitalism, and it was the launch-pad for socialist politics.<sup>40</sup>

Thomas states that many wealthy merchants had bought their way into the nobility, and among this class the liberal, free-trade doctrines that were emerging at the time were consequently widely supported among what we might here call a bogus "nobility." Hence, as Thomas states:

Liberal, modernising, free-trade ideas were widespread in this class, in the nobility as much as in the bourgeoisie. That is why the nobility put up so little resistance to the reforms of the National Assembly in 1789; indeed, many of the initiators of the reforms were nobles.<sup>41</sup>

We can be quite sure that it was this *nouveau riche* pseudo-nobility that flocked to the Masonic lodges and the salons, and provided the lar-

---

<sup>40</sup> Martin Thomas, "In Defence of the French Revolution," *Workers' Liberty* (no. 12-13, August 1989).

<http://www.workersliberty.org/story/2010/12/23/defence-french-revolution>

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*



gence for the Revolution. Thomas continues:

That masses of the poor people of the cities came to play a central role in the Revolution was a setback to progress rather than an advance. For those masses were hostile to the new liberal, modernising, free-trade ideas, and preferred a traditional, regulated economy.<sup>42</sup>

It is here, as this Trotskyite theorist accurately explains, that we see the start of a revolutionary process that overthrew the last feeble vestiges of the Traditional order, in the name of "the people," but at the behest of the moneyed classes. We do not have to hypothesize supposedly bizarre "conspiracy theories" in this regard; such revolutions are continuing to take place before our eyes, centering on the money and organizational network of plutocrats such as George Soros with his "color revolutions."<sup>43</sup> Note also that Thomas states that it was the *traditional* economy that was regulated; while the revolutionists — the Left — sought free-trade liberalism, and he even states that "the people" actually wanted, not the overthrow of tradition, but its reinvigoration. However, Thomas states that the bourgeoisie did not benefit from the Revolution any more than the poor, due to Napoleon. This assumes that Napoleon was a herald of the revolution rather than a repudiation of it. Rather, Napoleon reintroduced regulation to the economy, established a state bank, and began to re-establish guilds.

Thomas, after discussing the dialectical character of the French Revolution, concludes that it was the beginning of the modern Left:

In 1795, Gracchus Babeuf, a Jacobin who had worked in the Paris food administration, came to the conclusion that the only way to bring about equality was common ownership of wealth. He organised a group called the Conspiracy of Equals, which was broken up by the police in 1796. Babeuf was guillotined, but his ideas, through such people as Auguste Blanqui, inspired a whole current of socialist militancy in the 19th century. The group which Marx and Engels joined when they became socialists, and for which they wrote the *Communist Manifesto*, was part of that current. The French Revolution is the starting point for our politics.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> Bolton, *Revolution from Above*.

<sup>44</sup> Thomas, "In Defence of the French Revolution."



As with Marx and Engels' *Communist Manifesto*, and its vehemence against "reactionaries" who aimed to restore a pre-capitalist society, there is much that the Right can learn from Marxist ideologues such as Martin; albeit by way of negative example. Thomas, like Marx, Engels, and other Marxists, shows that the "Left" has its origins in liberal free-trade dogma, while the Right sought a return to a pre-capitalist order. The Left's post-capitalism is in reality a product of capitalism, rather than a repudiation of it. This claim is perfectly in keeping with Marxist dialectics, as Thomas explains in regard to the dialectical character of the French Revolution, which establishes a synthesis (Communism) in relation to its opposite (or, more accurately, its mirror image), capitalism. Hence, dialectically, Marxism grows from the capitalist seed, and continues to carry this capitalist seed within. The Right, on the other hand, in its genuine and original forms, does not incorporate any element of capitalism, and aims to restore a pre-capitalist order, which as Spengler, and Evola show, is not the same as restoring dead forms and manners, but restores the perennial—the values that are timeless and even metaphysical.

Kerry R. Bolton is a Fellow of the Academy of Social and Political Research (Athens), and of the Institute for Higher Studies on Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences (Lisbon), and is a contributing writer for *Foreign Policy Journal*. He has been widely published by the scholarly and general media. His books include: *Revolution from Above*, *The Psychotic Left*, *The Banking Swindle*, *Artists of the Right*, *Stalin: The Enduring Legacy*, *The Parihaka Cult*, *Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific: Emerging Conflicts, New Alliances*; *Babel Inc.*; *Peron and Peronism*, and introductions to T. E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, Hilaire Belloc's *Europe and the Faith*, Oscar Wilde's *Soul of Man Under Socialism* (Black House Publishing editions), and Francis Parker Yockey's *Imperium* (Wermod and Wermod).